Productive Separations: Emergent Governance of Reentry Labor by Shreya Subramani
Fordham Urban Law Journal 
Volume 47 
Number 4 Symposium: Urban Intelligence and 
the Emerging City 
Article 5 
2020 
Productive Separations: Emergent Governance of Reentry Labor 
Shreya Subramani 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj 
Recommended Citation 
Shreya Subramani, Productive Separations: Emergent Governance of Reentry Labor, 47 Fordham Urb. L.J. 
941 (2020). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol47/iss4/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact 
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Fordham University School of Law
 
941 
PRODUCTIVE SEPARATIONS: EMERGENT 
GOVERNANCE OF REENTRY LABOR 
Shreya Subramani* 
ABSTRACT 
This ethnographic Essay critiques progressive criminal justice 
reforms as neoliberal technologies that devalue racialized labor 
within the city of New Orleans, Louisiana.  It begins by describing the 
emergent “reentry space,” a proliferating network of policy and 
programming emerging to manage and provide services for formerly 
incarcerated people returning to the city.  Reentry is framed as a way 
to reinvest state and city resources and is also explicitly described as a 
project toward racial equality through decarceration. 
The reentry space is an exemplary landscape of what legal and 
policy scholarship has deemed “New Governance” as it mobilizes 
private-public partnerships and flexible orientations toward the law to 
innovate criminal justice governance (Part I).  My ethnography of the 
reentry space demonstrates the problematic deferral of racial justice 
through the New Governance practices of carceral reform programs.  
By analyzing the aspirations and practices of an experimental reentry 
alternative sentencing court and a municipal labor training network 
for reentrants, it traces how such reform programs depend upon an 
ideological delineation between the market and carcerality (Part II).  
It explores the dynamics of labor, value, and debt within Reentry 
Court practices that ultimately discount and devalue reentrant labor 
and thus further render reentrants more vulnerable to reincarceration 
and precarious employment (Part III).  It discusses the evaluation of 
experimental reentry programming, arguing that the definition of 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law and Society, CUNY John Jay College of Criminal 
Justice; Ph.D. Princeton University. I would like to thank Kelly Orians for her 
comments and collaboration on this work. Thank you also to Thomas Frampton for 
contributing as a commentator. Thanks to the Fordham Urban Law Journal editors 
and staff, especially Kaitlyn A. Laurie and Gabriella Romanos. 
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recidivism can also recapitulate the ideological assertion that 
separates the market and carcerality (Part IV). 
By mobilizing the analytic of racial capitalism, this Essay argues 
that racialized inequality is constitutive of economic markets through 
the capital-carceral circulations of people, labor, and value (Part V).  
The differential deployment of carceral punishment that 
disproportionately impacts poor communities of color and the 
devaluation of racialized labor are coextensive phenomena that 
emerge as novel configurations within experimental criminal justice 
reform.  Through ethnographic attention, this Essay demonstrates 
how the productivity of the experimental Reentry Court program to 
make devalued and discounted racialized labor is obscured by the 
assertion that the market is outside carcerality, and vice versa (Part 
VI).  This Essay concludes by discussing that while the role of law 
currently maintains these delineations between carcerality and the 
market through anchored legal categories, such novel spaces of 
governance allow for the emergence of the reentrant-worker as a 
subject who is not fixed, who is simultaneously under carceral 
management and ostensibly, enfranchised as a worker on the free 
market. 
The reentrant-worker is an ambiguous and underdetermined 
subject of governance who is not legally recognized but who is 
lawfully intervened upon.  While contexts of neoliberal criminal 
justice reform technology re/produce the conditions of racial 
capitalism, paying attention to the makings of novel subjectivities, 
such as the reentrant-worker, potentiates a political terrain that can 
critique and challenge the frontiers of racialized labor in the 
“Emerging City.” 
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“Punishment as labor, labor as punishment, and the curative and 
coercive forms they entwined were neither limited to an old regime of 
governance nor invented for new ones: the moral and political 
economy that weds labor and punishment remains the bedrock of our 
religious, educational, military, familial, and judicial systems to this 
day.  We would do well to understand how they have formed, how 
they have changes, and how they continue to work to affect the 
possibilities and constraints on so many people’s lives.” 
 
– Ann Laura Stoler, “In Carceral Motion: Disposals of Life and 
Labour”1 
INTRODUCTION 
The management of racialized labor through punitive institutions is 
not a novel technology of urban governance.  Today, relations 
between carcerality and the valuation of labor stem from legacies of 
plantation economies, chattel slavery, and long histories of racialized 
dispossession in the American city.2  However, as many scholars of 
race and carcerality have demonstrated, these relations have become 
reconfigured through movements of resistance and subsequent capital 
crises that have transformed contemporary racial politics in the 
United States.3  Such transformations require a conceptualization of 
racialized labor exploitation that traces the historical genealogies of 
contemporary carcerality within the afterlives of slavery and empire, 
while also attending to how racialized labor regimes today are 
ideologically and materially enacted.4  It is with this in mind that this 
ethnographic Essay critiques progressive criminal justice reforms as 
 
 1. Ann Laura Stoler, In Carceral Motion: Disposals of Life and Labour, in A 
GLOBAL HISTORY OF CONVICTS AND PENAL COLONIES 372 (Clare Anderson ed., 
2018). 
 2. See Nikhil Pal Singh, On Race, Violence, and ‘So-Called Primitive 
Accumulation’, in FUTURES OF BLACK RADICALISM 39–58 (Gaye Theresa Johnson & 
Alex Lubin eds., 2017); Loïc Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison 
Meet and Mesh, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 95, 99 (2001); Loïc Wacquant, From Slavery 
to Mass Incarceration: Rethinking the ‘Race Question’ in the US, 13 NEW LEFT REV. 
41, 41–42 (2002). 
 3. RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND 
OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 26–27 (2007); NIKHIL PAL SINGH, RACE 
AND AMERICA’S LONG WAR ix–xx (2017); Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Globalisation and 
US Prison Growth: From Military Keynesianism to Post-Keynesian Militarism, 40 
RACE & CLASS 171, 175–76 (1999); Nikhil Pal Singh, The Whiteness of Police, 66 AM. 
Q. 1091, 1092 (2014). 
 4. Deborah A. Thomas, Time and the Otherwise: Plantations, Garrisons and 
Being Human in the Caribbean, 16 ANTHRO. THEORY 177, 179 (2016). 
944 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
neoliberal technologies that manage and devalue racialized labor 
within the city.  These technologies enact novel modes that, while 
haunted by the historical repertoires of racial regimes past, chart an 
emergent frontier of racialized governance.5 
I. THE REENTRY SPACE AS NEW GOVERNANCE 
My ethnographic research explores prisoner reentry programs in 
New Orleans, Louisiana — with a primary focus on workforce 
development for the formerly incarcerated.6  Louisiana is known as 
the incarceration capital of the world, and the city of New Orleans is 
the nationwide leader in urban incarceration.7  In the state of 
Louisiana, and the United States more broadly, there has been a 
growing bipartisan consensus in the last decade that mass 
incarceration is unjustifiable on both economic and moral grounds.8  
 
 5. See AVERY F. GORDON, GHOSTLY MATTERS: HAUNTING AND THE 
SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION xv–xvi (2008). See generally SAIDIYA V. HARTMAN, 
SCENES OF SUBJECTION: TERROR, SLAVERY, AND SELF-MAKING IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1997); DEBORAH A. THOMAS, POLITICAL LIFE IN 
THE WAKE OF THE PLANTATION (2019). Thomas traces the complex relations of state 
violence in post-plantation societies through “archives of affect” in which political 
fields emerge through the “reactivation” of certain affective legacies. 
 6. This Essay is drawn from ethnographic fieldwork conducted in New Orleans, 
Louisiana between 2016–2018. My research explores the experiences of formerly 
incarcerated men and their families, legal professionals, nonprofit operatives, city 
planners, and municipal bureaucrats as they differentially construct and populate 
prisoner reentry reform policy and programming. In particular, I focus on workforce 
development and housing initiatives. I situate these experiences within overlapping 
historical trajectories, from antebellum plantation economies to post-war racializing 
processes of urbanization and privatization to the post-Katrina contemporary, where 
nonprofits and start-up companies have become primary actors in municipal 
governance. My broader research demonstrates that innovations in progressive urban 
governance — characterized by a valorization of entrepreneurialism, design-thinking, 
and data-driven best practices — attempt to ameliorate racial inequality, but 
ultimately displace and defer racial justice. At the same time, by theorizing the 
vernacular practices of my interlocutors as moments of Black radical praxis, I show 
how people challenge the carceral geographies and neoliberal socialites of what I call 
“reformist New Orleans” to enact a more radical distributive politics. 
 7. See State-by-State Data, SENT’G PROJECT, 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/the-facts/ [https://perma.cc/4F6Q-9HGP] (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2020). In 2016, Louisiana had the highest per capita incarceration 
rate in the United States, with 816 people in prison for every 100,000 residents. Id. 
That was nearly double the national average of 450 per 100,000 residents. See id. for 
more data on the growth of the New Orleans jail population. 
 8. CALVIN JOHNSON ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE NEW ORLEANS, JUSTICE IN 
KATRINA’S WAKE: CHANGING COURSE ON INCARCERATION IN NEW ORLEANS 4 
(2015); Michael M. O’Hear, The Second Chance Act and the Future of Reentry 
Reform, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 75, 75 (2007); Jeremy Travis, Reflections on the 
Reentry Movement, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 84, 84 (2007). 
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Such a political shift is evinced by Louisiana’s 2017 Justice 
Reinvestment legislation package, which has implemented an 
overhaul in criminal justice sentencing and prisoner eligibility for 
release, as well as invested funds toward the growth of reentry 
services.9  Reentry is framed as a way to reinvest state and city 
resources and is also described as a project toward racial equality 
through decarceration.10 
The reentry infrastructure in New Orleans emerged through the 
efforts of a diverse range of institutional actors, which includes law 
enforcement and legal agencies, nonprofits, universities, and private 
industry — all tasked with innovating aspects of criminal justice.11  A 
loosely coordinated constellation of experimental programming made 
up of transitional housing, substance abuse and mental health 
treatment facilities, and workforce development programs were 
established to triage the anticipated needs of formerly incarcerated 
 
 9. LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR., LA. COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T, 
LOUISIANA’S JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REFORMS FIRST ANNUAL PERFORMANCE 
REPORT 14–15 (2018), 
https://gov.louisiana.gov/assets/docs/JRI/LA_JRI_Annual_Report_FINAL.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/3USB-MY93]; LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR., LOUISIANA’S 
JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REFORMS PRACTITIONERS’ GUIDE 5–6 (2017), 
https://www.lasc.org/documents/LA_Practitioners_Guide_Justice_Reinvestment_Ref
orms_FINAL_2017-8-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G326-D6SM]. 
 10. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., LOUISIANA’S 2017 CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS: THE 
MOST INCARCERATED STATE CHANGES COURSE 1 (2018), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2018/03/pspp_louisianas_2017_criminal_just
ice_reforms.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CFW-XSGM]. My interlocutors in New Orleans 
who worked within reentry nonprofits and who supported decarceration legislation 
often described the potential for reentry to attend to racial inequality because of the 
disproportionate impact of incarceration on poor communities of color, and mainly 
Black New Orleanians. Of course, these are voices within a broader terrain of 
discourse. See, e.g., id.; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION SMART JUSTICE, BLUEPRINT FOR 
SMART JUSTICE: LOUISIANA 9 (2018), 
https://50stateblueprint.aclu.org/assets/reports/SJ-Blueprint-LA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9CLX-VN74]. In this report, the ACLU specifically discusses 
targeted criminal justice reform that would attend to racial inequality. Reentry in this 
reading is not to just prioritize diversion over incarceration or decarceration more 
broadly, but to emphasize how to enact these reforms toward racial justice missions. 
 11. See NEW ORLEANS REENTRY TASK FORCE, http://nolareentry.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/7HN2-3PWJ] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020). The Reentry Task Force 
in New Orleans was established as coalition for reentry services in the city. See also 
WWL Staff & Duke Carter, Goodwill, Nearly 100 Organizations Start Orleans 
Re-Entry Task Force, 4WWL (Mar. 31, 2019), 
https://www.wwltv.com/article/news/goodwill-nearly-100-organizations-start-orleans-r
e-entry-task-force/289-a3aa21cd-d63e-4f71-acd0-938c1031389f 
[https://perma.cc/4QYW-N3GU]. While the New Orleans Task Force is one 
institutional iteration of reentry service provisioning, many other organizations and 
businesses and individuals participated in in this growing infrastructure and market. 
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people coming back to the city.12  This proliferating network of policy 
and programming was often referred to by my interlocutors as “the 
reentry space.”13 
The reentry space is an exemplary landscape of what legal and 
policy scholarship has deemed “New Governance,” as it mobilizes 
private-public partnerships toward progressive reform.14  
Characterized by the valorization of experimentality, “soft law” 
flexibility, and the collaborative deregulated participation of diverse 
stakeholders, New Governance has spurred much scholarly and 
public debate.15  While many New Governance theorists have 
considered its positive potentials to engender more equitable policy 
decisionmaking, others have demonstrated the problematic forms 
through which it maintains and exacerbates inequality as stakeholder 
participation is inherently asymmetrical and is “weighted towards 
protecting certain interests.”16  New Governance case studies, like 
Professor Lisa T. Alexander’s critique of the HOPE VI public 
housing reform process in Chicago, demonstrate that even if 
marginalized stakeholders are invited to participate in policy problem 
solving, “rights-based regulation and litigation may need to operate in 
tandem with new governance processes” because of the long-standing 
histories of group-differentiated exclusions and social conflict.17 
 
 12. Workgroups, NEW ORLEANS REENTRY TASK FORCE, 
http://nolareentry.org/workgroups/ [https://perma.cc/YK3D-FKQB] (last visited Mar. 
13, 2020). 
 13. In my research, I take up the emic landscape of policy and programming of 
“the reentry space” as both a novel public-private institutional infrastructure and a 
burgeoning speculative market. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 14. See generally LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 3 
(Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (compiling scholarly articles on New 
Governance in the United States and in the European Union). 
 15. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 284 (1998); Jody Freeman, Collaborative 
Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 7 (1997); Jody 
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547 (2000); 
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004); Lester M. Salamon, 
The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1611, 1623 (2001). 
 16. Audrey G. McFarlane, When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted 
Terrain of Community Participation in Economic Development, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 
861, 902 (2000). 
 17. Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons 
from Chicago, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 117, 122 (2009). In this case study, 
Alexander discusses the inadequacy of New Governance practices of collaboration 
and “soft law” to account for the stark social and racial conflicts that surround the 
struggle for housing and public space in the city. For other examples of New 
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The ethics and practices of New Governance stakeholdership in 
American criminal justice reform emerge through bipartisan alliances 
that claim consensus and commitment to decarceration.18  However, 
such consensus is questioned as the economic and moral justifications 
for reform, on the right and the left, are multiple and often are 
incommensurable projects predicated on very different 
understandings about the problem of incarceration.  As Professor 
Benjamin Levin writes, underlying disagreements “do not accord 
neatly with U.S. political parties or conventional packages of views.  
Instead, they reflect deeper beliefs about the role of the state and the 
proper function of the criminal system that reject easy political 
categorization.”19  Moreover, this myth of consensus obscures the 
racialized and racializing repercussions of privatizing community 
corrections programs and experimenting with the lives of the poor 
communities of color who are disproportionately imprisoned and 
impacted by the carceral state.  There is a recognized resemblance 
between the “flawed coalitions” of bipartisanship that participated in 
the expansion of harsh federal sentencing laws that led to the over-
imprisonment of Black and Brown communities and those that are 
emerging around “problem-solving” progressive courts today.20  In 
the words of legal scholar Carl Takei, “these left-right reform efforts 
risk creating a nightmare scenario of mass control, surveillance, and 
monitoring of Black and Brown communities.”21  The long histories 
 
Governance case studies, see Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 155, 195 (2000) (describing non-bureaucratic stakeholder participation in the 
Habitat Conservation Plan); Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing 
Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 250–51 (2006) 
(exploring the role of “organizational catalysts” to attend to institutional racial and 
gender diversity initiatives in higher education); Louise G. Trubek, New Governance 
and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139, 145 (2006) 
(describing the use of public-private collaborations in the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA)). 
 18. See, e.g., CORY BOOKER ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, ENDING MASS 
INCARCERATION: IDEAS FROM TODAY’S LEADERS viii (Inmai Chettiar & Priya 
Raghavan eds., 2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_EndingMassIncarce
ration_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/AN8R-735N] (contributors to this report are 
representative of these bipartisan stakeholders from liberal politicians to 
conservative republican capitalists). 
 19. Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. 
L. REV. 259, 266 (2018). 
 20. David Jaros, Flawed Coalitions and the Politics of Crime, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
1473, 1504–05 (2014). 
 21. Carl Takei, From Mass Incarceration to Mass Control, and Back Again: How 
Bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform May Lead to a For-Profit Nightmare, 20 U. PA. 
J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 125, 128 (2017). 
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of the surveillance and criminalization of Blackness are thus 
reconfigured and recast in novel modalities through a seemingly 
progressive agenda towards racial justice.22  The liberal initiatives in 
the United States attendant to racial inequity can set the grounds to 
expand the reach of the racialized carceral state.23   
My ethnography of the reentry space demonstrates the problematic 
deferral of racial justice through carceral reform programs.  I consider 
the reentry space as charting a space of exception.24  By this, I mean 
the innovative flexibility of experimental criminal justice enacts 
violations of laws and norms to attend to the “crisis” of reentry and, 
by extension, mass incarceration.  This Essay interrogates the novel 
configurations of carceral governance as an emergent frontier of 
neoliberal racial capitalism.  In using the term carceral governance, I 
am including punitive state institutions (for example, prisons, criminal 
courts, and police) and the geographies of confinement and control 
they enact.  But this concept also encompasses experimental spaces of 
“innovation” managed in part by private companies, nonprofits, and 
startup organizations that rely upon the circulations of people, capital, 
and labor through those geographies to produce capital value.25 
Racial capitalism, a concept originally developed through the work 
of Cedric Robinson, serves as a guiding analytic to engage some of 
the contradictions of this emergent reentry space.26  Racial capitalism 
argues that racial differentiation is intrinsic to modern capitalism and 
combats theorizations that figure racial differentiation as incidental to 
capital accumulation and valuation.27  That is to say, capitalism is a 
 
 22. See, e.g., SIMONE BROWNE, DARK MATTERS: ON THE SURVEILLANCE OF 
BLACKNESS (2015); KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF 
BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA 88–145 
(2019). 
 23. See generally NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS 
BUILT PRISON AMERICA (2014). 
 24. Here, I am evoking Giorgio Agamben’s theorization of the state of exception 
through which juridical order is suspended in the case of a crisis threatening the state. 
See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., 2005). The 
concept of exception as intrinsic to law is also developed by the work of Carl Schmitt 
and Walter Benjamin in the early twentieth century. Walter Benjamin, Critique of 
Violence, in WALTER BENJAMIN: SELECTED WRITINGS VOLUME ONE 1913–1926 
(Marcus Bullock & Michael W. Jennings eds., 2004); CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL 
THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab 
trans., 2005). 
 25. See Ruha Benjamin, Catching Our Breath: Critical Race STS and the 
Carceral Imagination, 2 ENGAGING SCI., TECH., & SOC. 145, 150–51 (2016). 
 26. CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, BLACK MARXISM: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK 
RADICAL TRADITION 2–3 (2000). 
 27. Id. 
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racial system.28  In the context of the reentry space, this capacious 
analytic recognizes the genealogic relation to the deep and durable 
racial histories of Black dispossession by white accumulation in the 
United States, while also attending to the productive and ever-
evolving relations that make capital value through racialization today.  
Drawing from scholars such as Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Alexander 
Weheliye, and Nikhil Pal Singh, I take racialization to be the group-
differentiated devaluation of human life.29  Such a definition can 
critique emergent forms of racial governance that do not necessarily 
articulate as repetitions or reproductions of racism along color lines.  
This analytic tradition privileges the study of relational social 
formations, and I join social theorist Jodi Melamed who argues that a 
way to “strengthen racial capitalism as an activist hermeneutic is to 
use it to name and analyze the production of social separateness — 
the disjoining or deactiving of relations between human beings . . . — 
needed for capitalist expropriation to work.”30 
This Essay demonstrates how the reentry space reproduces the 
ideological delineation between the market and carcerality.  Through 
 
 28. See Prisons and Class Warfare: Interview with Ruth Wilson Gilmore, HIST. 
MATERIALISM BLOG (Aug. 2, 2018), 
http://www.historicalmaterialism.org/index.php/interviews/prisons-and-class-warfare 
[https://perma.cc/E3DM-6TLT]. This interview discusses the capital surplus crises 
through which the California Prison System expanded. Id. Gilmore mobilizes a 
reading of racial capitalism to discuss how inequality is inherent to capitalist crisis 
and transformation. Id. 
 29. In my research, I use the concept of racialization to understand how criminal 
justice reform practices do not just partake in governing the racial order but make 
race through novel reconfigurations and technologies. These scholars all attend to the 
making of race through racializing assemblages that differentially value or 
vulnerabilize human life. They discuss the heterogeneity through which race and 
racism are enacted. See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 3, at 28; SINGH, supra note 3, at 
xv–xvi; ALEXANDER G. WEHELIYE, HABEAS VISCUS: RACIALIZING ASSEMBLAGES, 
BIOPOLITICS, AND BLACK FEMINIST THEORIES OF THE HUMAN 3–4 (2014). Weheliye 
construes 
race, racialization, and racial identities as ongoing sets of political relations 
that require, through constant perpetuation via institutions, discourses, 
practices, desires, infrastructures, languages, technologies, sciences, 
economies, dreams, and cultural artifacts, the barring of nonwhite subjects 
from the category of the human as it is preformed in the modern west . . . . If 
racialization is understood not as a biological or cultural descriptor but as a 
conglomerate of sociopolitical relations that discipline humanity into full 
humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans, then blackness designates a 
changing system of unequal power structures that apportion and delimit 
which humans can lay claim to full human status and which humans cannot. 
Id. at 3. 
 30. Jodi Melamed, Racial Capitalism, CRITICAL ETHNIC STUDS., Spring 2015, at 
76, 78. 
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a case study of an experimental Reentry Court in New Orleans, this 
Essay traces how labor markets and carceral circulations are mutually 
constituted.  Deploying a racial capitalist reading of this reentry 
program, I argue that the ideological disconnection between the 
market and carcerality asserted by this judicial milieu obscures how 
racialization produced through carcerality is intrinsic to the making of 
capital value and accumulation. 
II. REENTRY COURT: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC TOUR OF MARKET-
CARCERAL BOUNDARY MAKING 
From 2016–2018, I chronicled a unique and locally celebrated 
collaboration between the Louisiana State Penitentiary (also known 
as “Angola Prison”) and an experimental workforce development 
court in New Orleans.31  Recognizing that unemployment and poverty 
contribute to rates of incarceration and that formerly incarcerated 
individuals face discrimination by employers after they serve time, 
this alternative-sentencing court aims to reduce recidivism by 
ensuring employment after prison.  The New Orleans Reentry Court 
sentences individuals to a specialized vocational training campus at 
Angola, where they are trained and certified as skilled laborers.32   
Upon release, the court provides an avenue to be hired by a local 
employer.  This court presided over by Judge V started as a pilot in 
 
 31. It should be noted that this Reentry Court is primarily for men. There was an 
intended expansion of this program to a women’s penitentiary, Louisiana 
Correctional Institute for Women, but there was damaging flooding of this facility 
which lead to the displacement of inmates. See Grace Toothey, ‘Temporary Has 
Become Permanent’ for Displaced Inmates of Flooded Louisiana Women’s Prison, 
ADVOCATE (Apr. 20, 2019), 
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_0fcebfb8-5d6b-
11e9-bac5-f7b4ee1d77f0.html [https://perma.cc/83KV-H2JD]. The reentry 
infrastructure for women in New Orleans, in Louisiana, and in the country is not at 
all as robust as the programming available for incarcerated men. 
 32. The Louisiana State Penitentiary is one example that not only draws out these 
analogous functions between the institution of chattel slavery and the penitentiary, 
but also shows the direct historical and material linkages between plantation 
economies and prison labor. See generally MARK T. CARLETON, POLITICS AND 
PUNISHMENT: THE HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA STATE PENAL SYSTEM (1971). Built 
directly upon the land of a plantation, the prison is referred to by the same name as 
the plantation, “Angola.” The Angola Plantation was named after the African 
country from which most Louisiana’s slaves came. It functioned as a privately-owned 
prison in the 1880’s by housing inmates in the former slave’s quarters and forcing 
them to work at hard labor on the plantation. The State of Louisiana took control 
over the prison in 1901 and continued to work prisoners in the fields — a practice 
that has given Angola the nickname of “the Farm” today. Angola Prison also partook 
in the practice of convict leasing; the state would lease out its prisoners to work the 
surrounding plantations that could no longer use slave labor. 
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2010, and was one of the first reentry programs of its kind in the 
country.33  It has now been established in 13 parishes in the state of 
Louisiana and is run differently in each parish as it relies on the 
regulatory digression of the presiding judge.  According to a 2016 
published flyer, “[n]ot only has the program already shown a 
significant decrease in the recidivism rates for participants, but it also 
has a great potential to cut costs within the criminal justice system.”34  
This court program is exemplary of New Governance practices of 
private-public collaboration and the flexible deployment of soft law.  I 
like to think of the New Governance space of Reentry Court through 
a metaphor one of the administrators used to describe it: “Building 
the plane as you fly it!”35 
In this experimental court program, recommended offenders who 
plead guilty to nonviolent charges with sentences under ten years are 
eligible to be trained at the reentry campus.36  Many who ultimately 
participated in the program were recommended to Reentry Court 
over risking a trial or facing what were oftentimes shorter sentences 
or community supervision on probation.  That is to say, some people 
have accepted and served a prison sentence or extended a prison 
sentence in order to participate in the reentry program.  As Judge V 
would often describe in court, “You can either just do your time, or 
you can invest in yourself by joining Reentry Court.” 
On the reentry campus at Angola, participants are meant to choose 
two vocational tracks, which include fields like electrical, plumbing, 
HVAC maintenance, automotive repair, and landscaping.  However, 
this choice is contested among many participants who say that there 
 
 33. For the sake of anonymity, I have changed names and identifying details 
about the interlocuters I mention in this Essay. All information about the Reentry 
Court will be discussed as firsthand knowledge gained through my ethnographic 
research. My methods of participant observation included my attendance at court 
proceedings and semi-structured interviews with the Judge, administrators, and 
organizational partners of the court as well as reentrant participants and their social 
network. Statistical information about this experimental program are limited as they 
are not published. However, part of this research is to explore the making of reform 
“efficacy data” as a critical ethnographic object of study. 
 34. LOUISIANA REENTRY COURT PROGRAM (2016) (on file with author). This 
flyer depicts the cost effectiveness of Reentry Court probation, comparing $934 per 
year per person in relation to $19,458 a year per prisoner incarcerated. 
 35. This was said often by an interlocutor that I will call Sherry, who works as a 
workforce development consultant for the Reentry Court. 
 36. Public defenders usually ask the judge when they believe a client is eligible for 
Reentry Court matriculation. Men are sentenced to the reentry campus at the 
Louisiana State Penitentiary only if they are charged with nonviolent or nonsexual 
offenses. Sentences are a minimum of two years for GED completion and vocational 
training. 
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are set numbers for each track and that discrimination against or 
preferential treatment of certain inmates by mentors and correctional 
officers often impact their options.  Men serving life sentences mentor 
and train participants in the vocational trades and tutor them to 
complete their GED.37 
Upon release, participants are subject to supervision by New 
Orleans Probation and Parole Office and are assigned a Reentry 
Court case manager.  They are also required to make monthly court 
appearances and attend weekly mentorship meetings run by court 
affiliated nonprofits.  The case management team sets personal 
benchmarks each month for each participant.  Reentry Court is not 
included on the regular criminal court docket.  Instead, the judge 
takes off her robe and sits alongside the panel of officers and case 
managers at a long wooden table.  Members of the public sitting in 
the gallery are asked to introduce themselves and identify their 
interest in reentry.  Reentrants are called up to sit at the table and 
discuss their monthly progress with the team in front of the other 
participants and the court attendees. 
During my fieldwork, Reentry Court was affiliated with a fledgling 
initiative started by the Obama-appointed U.S. Attorney’s office that 
offered tax abatements to employers who agreed to hire two formerly 
incarcerated men from the court for a two-year trial period.  To 
recruit potential employers from New Orleans, a representative from 
the U.S. Attorney’s office, Elizabeth, and the presiding judge of 
Reentry Court would organize tours of the reentry vocational training 
campus located at Angola Prison. 
Elizabeth would give an introduction on the two-hour bus ride to 
the employers, outlining the benefits of participating in the program 
for their businesses.  She would read out statistics about recidivism 
and employment, stating that formerly incarcerated individuals are 
unemployed at a rate of over 27% in the United States and that, in 
Louisiana, about 43% of those released from prison will recidivate 
within five years — partially attributing recidivism to 
unemployment.38  She then would conclude by saying, “[t]he campus 
 
 37. From my interviews with Reentry Court staff, I came to know that there were 
approximately 75 mentors serving life sentences training reentrants and about 130 
reentrants participating in the program from 13 parishes across the state as of 2016. 
Approximately 30 reentrant participants (with new participants and graduating 
participants staggering during my two years of fieldwork) were from Orleans Parish. 
The majority of these participants attended Judge V’s section of the court program. 
My ethnographic work is primarily in this court. 
 38. Lucius Couloute & Daniel Kopf, Out of Prison & Out of Work: 
Unemployment Among Formerly Incarcerated People, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE 
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is very impressive. It is amazing how prisoners serving life sentences 
have really taken on managerial roles.” 
I was struck by the range of employers who expressed interest in 
the program, from small family-owned businesses to city agencies to 
massive-scale corporate entities.  For example, Miss Thelma, who, at 
70, ran a few popular diners in New Orleans and wanted “to give 
these men an opportunity that she hopes her grandson will have when 
he gets out.”  There was also Tim, from the New Orleans Sewage and 
Water Board, who was interested in hiring laborers to work on the 
proposed retrofitting of the city’s water infrastructure.  Then there 
was Steve from Global Workmen, a contracting company that staffs 
commercial construction projects.  According to their corporate 
mission statement, Global Workmen provided temporary laborers to 
development companies and promised to limit benefits expenditures, 
minimize unemployment costs, and reduce workers’ compensation 
exposure for those companies.39 
Once we reached the prison reentry campus, Elizabeth took us 
through each vocational training area.  During the tour, the “lifers” — 
prisoners serving life sentences who are the mentors and instructors 
of the reentry trainees — described their pedagogy to the employers.  
“We seek to teach both the vocational skills but also the soft skills 
you need to keep a job,” said one mentor.  We first traveled through a 
huge garage for auto mechanic certification, where cars come directly 
from General Motors to be worked on, on to the greenhouse used for 
the horticultural and landscaping certification, to the workshop for 
the welding and electrical certification, and finally arrived at the large 
HVAC shop filled with refrigerators and ventilation shafts.  Here, the 
employers and all the reentry trainees sat down for a concluding 
group discussion. 
Judge V thanked all the employers for taking the trip to meet their 
potential employees. She retold the origins of the program.  The idea 
for it emerged from her yearning to help those with life sentences do 
something meaningful and productive with their time in prison.  “And 
now, they help to create the next workforce through this program,” 
 
(July 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/outofwork.html 
[https://perma.cc/JJD8-BTX3]. 
 39. While I have changed the name and details of the actors and organizations in 
my ethnographic writing, I draw on similar kinds of actors to convey my analytic 
points. Please see an existing company that resembles that of the one I describe 
above. TRADESMAN INT’L, 
https://www.tradesmeninternational.com/staffing/reserve/#cform 
[https://perma.cc/2NR4-LAXY] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020). 
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she declared.  Judge V asked who would be released within the year, 
and about 20 men stood up.  Pointing to the side of the room where 
the tour group was seated, Judge V said, “Talk to these folks here 
today.  They could be your bosses when you get out.  They could give 
you a shot.”  After a few reentrants gave testimonials about what they 
had learned on campus, one prisoner chimed in, “I wanted to be in 
welding, if anything, but they wouldn’t let me.  I don’t find HVAC 
interesting.”  This comment upset Judge V: 
These men take the time to provide training for you all. I was a 
lawyer and now am a judge.  When I was getting my training, I had a 
job and other responsibilities.  What I wouldn’t have given for the 
kind of time you all have while you are here.  Time to think, time to 
learn, time to work, and become really good at something.  What is 
it that you want? 
The reentry trainee responded, “I want to be an entrepreneur and 
own my own business after I get out.”  To this, Judge V responds, 
“Can I ask you a question? How do you get to the door?”  The 
reentry trainee looked at her, confused. 
“Did you walk to the door?  Or do you float to the door?  Because 
let me tell you, you sound like you think you can float to the door, but 
you have to crawl before you walk, you have to walk before you can 
run.”  She continued, “You can’t skip steps, and especially being in 
this program, you have to take the jobs available to you.” 
On the bus ride back to New Orleans, our reentry tour guide, 
Elizabeth and I struck up a conversation about a Reentry Court 
participant, Carter, who had been recently fired from one of the 
program’s employers.  She described to me that the employment 
initiative “serves to remove the stigma of employing a formerly 
incarcerated person.”  However, in her eyes, Carter’s termination 
“resulted from a natural up and down of the market” and “not 
because he was formerly incarcerated.”  Then she added, “[w]e can 
only try to account for one of those issues.” 
This delineation made by Elizabeth gave me pause.  In this 
framing, the free labor market began where carcerality ended.  The 
carceral experience was figured as outside of the market.  However, 
not 20 minutes ago, we had both been in the midst of labor 
recruitment happening within the prison.  We were watching men 
work on cars for General Motors dealerships.  We were watching 
them network with potential employers by demonstrating both their 
vocational and soft skills.  Nothing I saw during this visit seemed 
divorced from market forces.  In the case of Carter’s termination, how 
could she tell the difference between discrimination on the grounds of 
being formerly incarcerated and the discrimination of the market? 
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My question in some sense sounds naïve because this assumption 
— that there is a bounded free market made of competing economic 
actors on the one hand, and a bounded space of incarceration that is 
primarily one of confinement and exclusion from the market — was 
not unique to Elizabeth.  Upon reflection, both of the reentry 
program representatives characterized the experience of 
incarceration as firmly outside economic markets.  Judge V’s 
comments cast incarceration as an undisturbed time to invest in the 
self, suggesting that serving a prison sentence (aka “doing time”) is a 
suspension from other forms of temporal organization, like the 
responsibility of a real job outside of prison.  The judge’s metaphor 
stresses a normative assumption that there are specific developmental 
stages to move from vocational laborer to managerial role to 
entrepreneur/innovator.  The vocational training on the prison 
campus is framed as the educational starting point of self-investment.  
It is figured as the unpaid labor required before one can move to 
forms of wage labor and then perhaps, eventually capital ownership.  
She alludes to incarceration as being outside of development, such 
that personal, professional, and financial growth can only manifest 
once you leave prison through a predetermined telos of labor; you do 
not “float to the door,” you “crawl” and “walk” first.  It is discussed 
as though it is common sense. 
Of course, this teleological assumption of progress is troubled 
when considering the contemporary values of city labor markets 
today in relation to vocational labor.  Reentry workforce 
development limits the potential labor markets reentrants may enter 
by providing vocational training that is designed to subtend industries 
within the real estate, tech, and idea economy.  They train within 
industries that do not demonstrate growth potential, given the 
patterns of contemporary urban capital investment.  Thus, reentrants 
often enter precarious markets of temporary, unskilled jobs instead of 
contractually sustainable and salaried jobs.  This is juxtaposed with 
the valorization of flexibility and mobility within the emergent 
“innovation economy,” comprised of elite transplants to the city who 
participate in urban governance through social entrepreneurship and 
startup companies.  These individuals are not necessarily held to the 
developmental stages of labor, but rather their symbolic capital and 
financial resources render them as already leading the next frontier of 
capital investment in the American economy.40 
 
 40. The 2016 Democratic Party Platform illustrates this distinction as coded by 
liberal social policy. DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM COMM., 2016 DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
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I want to note that these examples are not intended to merely 
depict Judge V or Elizabeth as condescending or dismissive of the 
carceral experience.  Rather, I believe their ideological separation of 
carcerality and the market echo the logics that structure criminal 
justice reform more broadly.41  It even resonates with sociological 
scholarship about neoliberalism that places carceral punishment at 
the margins of the market.  As Professor Bernard Harcourt argues, 
neoliberal penality is “a form of rationality in which the penal sphere 
is pushed outside political economy and serves the function of a 
boundary: the penal sanction is marked off from the dominant logic 
of classical economics as the only space where order is legitimately 
enforced by the state.”42  Sociological scholar Loïc Wacquant’s 
theorization of the “penal state” similarly reduces the administrative 
power of the state to the criminalization and punitive sanction of 
those excluded from market participation.43  I therefore ask: What 
does this ideological boundary between carcerality and the market 
reveal, and what does it obscure? 
 
PLATFORM 8 (2016), 
https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2016_DNC_Platform.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/596E-MYFL]. In this proposal, the new frontiers of the U.S. labor 
market are characterized by “innovation economies” including the tech start-up 
sector which depend upon “the next generation of scientists, engineers, and 
entrepreneurs, especially women and people of color, to make sure America 
continues to out-compete and out-innovate the rest of the world with our bold 
innovation agenda.” Id. At the same time, this platform outlines the road to racial 
justice in the workforce as dependent upon vocational and technical skills training — 
the jobs that subtend such innovation at best or are entirely excluded from it. 
 41. See, e.g., Adrianne Jeffries, Why We Exclude Prisoners from the 
Unemployment Rate, OUTLINE (Jan. 27, 2017), 
https://theoutline.com/post/955/why-we-exclude-prisoners-from-the-unemployment-r
ate?zd=1&zi=ooktdxqf [https://perma.cc/A5JK-CRVH]. Prisoners are excluded from 
the unemployment rate as they are not fundamentally considered actors within the 
free labor market. Such practices inform criminal justice reform as the overarching 
logic is that of prisoners being excised from the market through incarceration. From 
my interviews with liberals and conservatives who supported the Louisiana Justice 
Reinvestment legislation, they all framed reentry as a way for formerly incarcerated 
people to rejoin the workforce. The market was outside of the prison and vice versa. 
 42. Bernard E. Harcourt, Neoliberal Penality: A Brief Genealogy, 14 
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 74, 77 (2010). 
 43. LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF 
SOCIAL INSECURITY 58–61 (2009). 
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III. DISCOUNT THROUGH MANAGEMENT, DEVALUE THROUGH 
DEBT 
The goal of the court program was to “encourage employers to 
invest in reentry.”44  To do so often meant reframing social justice 
rationales as business incentives.  The court program concedes that 
businesses will be taking on a risk by hiring a formerly incarcerated 
person and, therefore, offers financial incentives.  As mentioned, 
employers are promised tax abatements for hiring reentrants for a 
flexible trial period.  The tentative terms of reentrant employment, as 
well as the tacit agreement to assume certain operational costs and 
oversight, situate the experimental court and the Department of 
Probation and Parole in supervisory roles within labor markets.  
While this program in New Orleans has never described itself in this 
way, one rather crass pamphlet produced by a neighboring parish’s 
Business Alliance advertised employer investment in reentry as both 
cost-effective and easy to manage because “Probation and Parole 
serve as your Human Resources Department.”45  It is important to 
note also that employers do not have any contractual obligation to the 
reentrant employee or the court. 
Visitors to Reentry Court were encouraged to participate in the 
dialogue as the judge would often solicit the opinions or the 
opportunities the court attendees could offer the reentrants.  
Potential employers were always welcome to attend the Reentry 
Court proceedings every month and announce the job openings that 
they were hoping to fill.  Like when an owner of a bricklaying 
business addressed the Judge and the court: “I wanted to come here 
and tell you, Judge, what a great worker Darrell is.  Even if he’s been 
in trouble in the past, he is there every day on time for the job.  I’d 
like to hire four more, just like him.”  Here we see perhaps one of the 
more explicit (and somewhat audacious) examples of how the court 
as coextensive with the labor marketplace and the punitive apparatus 
works to render reentrant labor as redundant and thus, reentrant 
employees as potentially expendable.  The court also invites many 
nonprofits and social service providers in addition to employers to its 
proceedings. These organizations treat court like a marketplace, too, 
as they seek to offer a diverse array of services to the reentrant 
participants and often do as a result of the judge’s ruling.  Ultimately, 
 
 44. Interlocutor quote from the person I call Elizabeth. Such statements tacitly 
demonstrate how incentivizing private actors is crucial to the success of the court. 
 45. JEFFERSON PARISH BUSINESS ALLIANCE REENTRY PAMPHLET (2017) (on file 
with author). 
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the judge still holds punitive power and could send reentrants to jail 
for violating the terms of their release, which in this case includes 
losing a court-brokered job or refusing court-mandated programming. 
 The structures of debt that criminal justice institutions depend 
upon add another dimension to the ideological delineation between 
free market and carceral confinement.  Formerly incarcerated people 
often face insurmountable financial debt after release from prison, 
and participants in the Reentry Court are no exception.46  Court and 
Probation and Parole fines and fees continue to accrue as they 
participate in the reentry program back in the city.  Judge V offers 
opportunities to reduce court fees if reentrants participate in 
volunteer projects — sometimes offering $10 per hour of volunteer 
work, other times $5 or $12.  She changes her mind constantly and 
somewhat arbitrarily.  Once, she even offered $100 per hour, but 
quickly realized that this would bankrupt the court and subsequently 
rescinded.  Judge V would announce volunteer opportunities that 
were usually some form of manual labor or construction.  “Now, you 
can’t just expect everyone to pity you and offer their help.  If you are 
the ones who need help, you have to learn to pay it forward,” Judge V 
said one day before signing reentrants up to help paint a fence for a 
local nonprofit. 
The moral framing of volunteerism espoused by the court links the 
virtue of altruism to autonomy, and counterintuitively, to self-interest.  
The conditions of debt and supervision under which reentrants are 
beholden to the court contradict the very potential of autonomous 
volunteerism.  Their volunteerism is contoured through their 
indebtedness to the court and the value of their labor is determined 
by the Judge.  The Judge would sometimes be challenged about the 
rates of court fee deductions by Laurel, a public defender and reentry 
nonprofit director who works with the court.  Laurel would argue that 
$10 an hour would never be fair market rate to get a crew to do the 
same work, to which the Judge would sternly reply, “These are 
volunteer projects for reentry.  It shouldn’t even require monetary 
incentive.”  While Laurel argues that reentrant labor deserves a fair 
 
 46. See ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 24 (2010), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FI
NAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HKP-LPN7]; Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from 
Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 
AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1781 (2010). See generally KARIN D. MARTIN ET AL., HARV. UNIV. 
KENNEDY SCH., SHACKLED TO DEBT: CRIMINAL JUSTICE FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS 
AND THE BARRIERS TO RE-ENTRY THEY CREATE (2017), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249976.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SYX-T5DQ]. 
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market wage, Judge V makes clear that volunteerism is not wage 
labor, but rather, it is a mandate of the court. 
Volunteerism serves as a moral justification for the continued 
devaluation of reentrant labor vis-à-vis the court.  This casts such 
labor as outside of the market while maintaining the conditions of 
carceral indebtedness as this kind of devalued labor also prevents 
reentrants from accumulating financial wealth.  This example 
illustrates what legal scholar, Tayyab Mahmud, calls the suturing of 
debt and discipline in the neoliberal era, a joint venture of the market 
and the law.47  “For the working classes, the expanded deployment of 
the penal arm of the state increases the cost of not participating in the 
increasingly precarious labor markets.”48  The ideological boundary 
between the market and carcerality obscures how relations of labor 
and capital are fundamentally contoured by coercive, punitive 
regimes. 
Labor is discounted through the functioning of the court as a state-
subsidized marketplace as well as a coercive, punitive institution.  
Labor is devalued through structures of indebtedness — financial 
indebtedness to the court and moral indebtedness to society — that 
justify scarce remuneration for the reentrant labor volunteered by the 
court.  Understanding this devaluation of labor as a form of group-
differentiated devaluation of human life, or at least a devaluation of 
an aspect of moral and economic life, we see how the practices of the 
reformist court is a racializing technology.  The making of a reentrant 
labor force is the making of a novel racialized labor market. 
IV. EVALUATING REFORM: THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL SUPPORT OF 
THE BOUNDARY 
Innovations in criminal justice make new objects for knowledge 
production.  Part V turns to the epistemic boundary work that 
subtends the ideological separation between the market and 
carcerality.  While New Governance spaces like Reentry Court may 
require alternative orientations toward determining its efficacy, the 
primary category of judging reentry program success is recidivism.49  
 
 47. Tayyab Mahmud, Debt and Discipline: Neoliberal Political Economy and the 
Working Classes, 101 KY. L.J. 1, 42–43 (2013) (“Throughout history, debt both 
lubricated circuits of value extraction and acted as a disciplinary device.”); see also 
DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5,000 YEARS (2011). 
 48. Mahmud, supra note 47, at 52. 
 49. The recidivism rate in Louisiana as of 2015 was 43%. The rate of Orleans 
Parish was estimated between 43% and 49%. Reentry Initiatives & Transitional Work 
Programs, LA DEP’T PUB. SAFETY & CORRECTIONS, 
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Essentially, the success of reentry programs is judged by the question: 
Once people are released from prison, does this program keep people 
out of prison?  The private and public grants that funded some of the 
operations of the court, like the salaries of the case managers, for 
example, required efficacy reports that demonstrated that the court 
was indeed reducing recidivism.50 
In order to collect such data, an esteemed sociologist in New 
Orleans, Dr. M, was brought in by Judge V and Elizabeth to develop 
an efficacy assessment of Reentry Court.  His findings would be 
shared internally with the court administrators to tweak practices and 
procedures and also were intended to produce data that would be 
submitted to the granting institutions that invest in the court.  This 
data would also serve as part of the court program’s public relations 
strategy. 
Dr. M and I developed a rapport as we were usually the only two 
social scientists sitting in court.  While I was doing qualitative and 
independent ethnographic work, he was juggling his own qualitative 
notes while simultaneously developing a quantitative methodology 
for assessing the court’s success.  When discussing his methods and 
findings with me, expressed jocular envy that my ethnographic 
practice that allowed me to write down “the dramas of the court” and 
have “more free-flowing conversations” with court participants and 
staff.51  After telling me that he was asked by the Judge to asses 
recidivism rates, he said, “You’re lucky that you are documenting life 
experiences.  1s and 0s conveying recidivism or not recidivism is a 
ridiculous way to approach this court,” referring to the statistical 
binaries that he used to keep track of reentry participants.  He 
continued, sounding frustrated: 
Every single participant has a unique and extenuating case that 
cannot be used to model recidivism rates.  To help to see a pattern, I 
chose to technically factor any return to a cell — whether to jail or 
to prison — as recidivism.  If the goal of the program is to provide 
workforce participation, then any carceral disruption where they are 
taken out of the workforce for whatever period of time should count 
as recidivism.  Don’t you agree? 
 
https://doc.la.gov/reentry-overview [https://perma.cc/2WCC-TAHM] (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2020). 
 50. See generally PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 10. This report of the state 
Justice Reinvestment Package discusses how 70% of money saved through 
decarceration will be invested into grants for programs dedicated to recidivism 
prevention. Id. at 18. 
 51. These quotes signal Dr. M’s characterizations of the court and of my 
ethnographic practice. 
2020] PRODUCTIVE SEPARATIONS 961 
Definitions of recidivism vary a great deal within studies of 
criminal justice, which makes agreeing or disagreeing with Dr. M 
more complicated.52  The absence of a uniform definition of 
recidivism has long led studies of crime and punishment toward very 
diverse conclusions.53  According to the National Institute of Justice, 
“recidivism is measured by criminal acts that resulted in rearrest, 
reconviction or return to prison with or without a new sentence 
during a three-year period following the prisoner’s release.”54  I have 
read studies that do not consider a return to incarceration within set 
time frames, and others that still do not adequately differentiate 
criminal charges from probation or parole violations.55  As argued by 
Professor Robert Weisberg, the definition of recidivism remains 
“contingent on empirical uncertainty.”56 
It is, therefore, interesting in this context to see Dr. M struggle to 
develop a take on an operational definition of recidivism that relies 
on the concept of workforce disruption.  He alludes to the 
ambivalence of the court’s mission to ensure employment for 
reentrants after incarceration.  He sees participants frequently serving 
 
 52. Nathan G. Mandel et al., Recidivism Studied and Defined, 56 J. CRIM. L. 
CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI. 59, 59 (1965) (making a case for the development of a 
uniform definition of recidivism and finding that “[t]he reporting of these rates has 
heretofore lacked uniformity because of the absence of consensus in defining 
recidivism.”). See generally Harry Willbach, What Constitutes Recidivism, 33 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 32 (1942) (arguing for a uniform definition of recidivism 
that would be based on prior conviction of individuals). “Recidivism has a variety of 
meanings which are frequently used interchangeably with the result that statements 
or conclusions must be carefully explained and qualified. Because of this, the findings 
become vitiated and tend to create a morass which lacks clarity and hinders 
progress.” Id. at 32. Robert Weisberg, Meanings and Measures of Recidivism, 87 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 785, 785 (2014) (reviewing “how variable and contingent the formal 
definitions of measures of recidivism, and . . . address[es] the need for sensibly 
self-critical stipulations of the meaning of the term in order to make the most of any 
pragmatic use of the term feasible”). Weisberg is probably the most nuanced and 
reflexive take of these articles and does not argue for a particular kind of uniformity 
but problematizes the various conditions different notions of recidivism produce in 
the context of criminal justice reform. 
 53. Michael Ostermann et al., How Different Operationalizations of Recidivism 
Impact Conclusions of Effectiveness of Parole Supervision, 52 J. RES. CRIME & 
DELINQ. 771, 772–73 (2015). 
 54. Recidivism, NAT’L INST. JUST., https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/corrections/recidivism 
[https://perma.cc/B6RS-AEL6] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020). 
 55. See e.g., RYKEN GRATTET ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PAROLE 
VIOLATIONS AND REVOCATIONS IN CALIFORNIA 5 (2008), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/224521.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q88Y-SL5T] 
(failing to consider the period of time since grant of parole as a potentially relevant 
factor in evaluating recidivism rates). 
 56. Weisberg, supra note 52, at 787. 
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short jail sentences as punitive sanctions for probation violations but 
also as reprimands for losing court-brokered jobs.  Dr. M’s analysis 
thus would seemingly conclude a failure of the court to reduce 
recidivism through the reentrant employment managed by the court. 
Dr. M’s framing of recidivism as disruption ultimately reproduces 
the boundary between the market and carcerality.  In this case, the 
definition of recidivism considers being behind bars a rupture from 
participating in the free market.  Such an assertion begs the question: 
Is there ever really a point where these men will solely be in the realm 
of the free market if the condition on them being part of the market is 
their carceral management?  Defining recidivism as the oscillation 
between the confinement of carcerality and the freedom of market 
participation obscures the productivity of carceral circulations to 
differentially devalue labor.  A definition of recidivism that relies on 
the binaries between free and confined, market and carceral, mystifies 
the productivity of the Reentry Court as coextensive with the city’s 
labor market. 
V. RETHINKING RELATIONS: RACIAL CAPITALISM’S PRODUCTIVITY 
AT THE BOUNDARY 
In this Essay, I trace the delineations that are assumed self-evident 
within the reentry space: (1) carceral spaces of confinement are 
distinguished from the “free” spaces of capital flow; (2) criminal 
justice institutions govern those who are excluded from the market; 
(3) there are free contracts on the one hand, and work resulting from 
punitive coercion on the other.  However, as my empirical examples 
demonstrate, in practice, these distinctions break down.  As they do, 
it is revealed that the racializing processes of the criminal justice 
system are a technology constitutive of labor markets. 
The court controls the skills training on the prison campus; it 
determines the value of the skills that are discounted through tax 
abatements and subsidized operational costs, and it also determines 
the wage of labor that is devalued through structures of carceral debt.  
Moreover, as the effects of incarceration and the work of Reentry 
Court overwhelmingly target Black men in Louisiana, we have the 
re/production57 of discounted and devalued Black labor, which 
 
 57. I use the term “re/production” to signal capitalist reinvention and innovation 
that produce novel social assemblages alongside the historical repertoires of white 
supremacy and the heteronormative patriarchy that reproduce social orders through 
racial and gendered differentiations. Such a term draws from Black radical and 
feminist critiques of Marxism that argue that reproductions, reconfigurations and 
transformations in social orders merit analytic attention when studying capitalist 
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renders market discrimination and the differential deployment of 
carceral punishment as mutually constituted racializing forces 
entrenched in the histories of antiblackness and Black dispossession 
in the United States.58 
The critical scholarship on unpaid prison labor, including the 
histories of chain gangs and prison farms during and after the 
abolition of chattel slavery, for example, clearly identifies the 
inadequacy of figuring labor markets as distinct from carcerality.59  
The privatization of prisons, an issue that has gained much attention 
by progressive reformers, is also a salient example of a phenomenon 
that troubles the boundary between market and carcerality.60  These 
are important contexts through which the borderlands and contact 
zones of the market and carcerality are made obvious.  However, the 
analysis of these contexts can frame carcerality as something 
exploited by capitalism.  In other words, the private market takes 
advantage of public prison labor, or the private market profits by 
taking on the role of the state to lock people up.61  It treats the 
 
production. See ROBINSON, supra note 26 (tracing the development of the concept of 
racial capitalism that demonstrates how racial differentiation is intrinsic to capitalist 
development); Nancy Fraser, Contradictions of Capital and Care, NEW LEFT REV., 
July–Aug 2016, at 100, 103 (arguing that capitalism simultaneously relies upon and 
destabilizes social reproduction). See also supra note 29 for my discussion of the term 
racialization that is linked to this concept of re/production. 
 58. See, e.g., RACE AND LABOR MATTERS IN THE NEW U.S. ECONOMY (Manning 
Marable et al. eds., 2006); Augustus C. Wood III, The Crisis of the Black Worker, the 
U.S. Labor Movement, and Democracy for All, 44 LAB. STUD. J. 396, 399 (2019). 
 59. See generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE 
RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 
(2008); ALEX LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WORK OF FREE LABOR: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH (1996). 
 60. See Private Prisons in the United States, SENT’G PROJECT (Oct. 24, 2019), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/private-prisons-united-states/ 
[https://perma.cc/W2NE-ERZJ] (depicting the rise of private prison contracts in the 
United States). 
 61. See GILMORE, supra note 3, at 20–22 for discussions of why “racial cleansing” 
and “new slavery” as well as the privatization of prison arguments are not adequate 
to fully understanding the transformations of contemporary carcerality. See also 
Ruth Wilson Gilmore, The Worrying State of the Anti-Prison Movement, SOC. JUST. 
J. CRIME, CONFLICT & WORLD ORDER (Feb. 23, 2015), 
http://www.socialjusticejournal.org/the-worrying-state-of-the-anti-prison-movement/ 
[https://perma.cc/8UT8-J3JR]. Gilmore outlines the attention “new realists” within 
criminal justice reform pay to private prisons minimizes, “the fact that 92 percent of 
the vast money-sloshing public system is central to how capitalism’s racial inequality 
works.” Id. This also speaks to my critique that the relations of private-public 
collaborations under New Governance obscure the forms of public subsidies and the 
powers of the Department of Corrections that fundamentally are required for 
reentrant labor to be devalued and discounted. 
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racialized inequalities of differentially devalued labor and life made 
through carcerality as prior to market investment.  Such a framing 
recapitulates the premise that carceral spaces are potential frontiers 
for market exploitation and thus misrecognizes the mutually 
constitutive relations of the market and carcerality and does not give 
a more relationally expansive notion of how the prison industrial 
complex transforms.62 
I, therefore, argue that these phenomena are not simply market 
exploits but are instead part of what anthropologist Hannah Appel 
refers to as “the licit life of capitalism,” through which economic 
markets are constituted through racial differentiation.63  Racialized 
inequality is not incidental to the market and thus merely an 
advantage for capitalism’s appetites.  Racialized inequality constitutes 
economic markets through the capital-carceral circulations of people, 
labor, and value.  Geographer Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s work on the 
California prison system, for example, compellingly demonstrates this 
point through her concept of “the prison fix,” arguing that the growth 
of the racialized carceral system emerged to resolve capital surplus 
crises.64  Gilmore, alongside activist scholars like Angela Y. Davis 
points to how reform as a response to capital crises tends to 
“strengthen institutions, especially those geared to social control.”65  
Grounded attention to the political economies of criminal justice 
reform thereby offers a lens to revisit how racialized labor has 
historically been devalued and managed through historically 
transformed technologies of carceral power.  Moreover, as we 
consider the governance of reformist decarceration projects, like 
reentry programming, I argue that we must mobilize analytics that 
recognize the relational spaces emergent between the ideological 
separations asserted between markets and carcerality, between 
private and public, and between social reform and social control. 
Only then can we adequately critique how the technologies of 
neoliberal racial capitalism forge the frontiers of carceral expansion.  
That is to say, the very ambiguous spaces made through such 
practices of New Governance within criminal justice today are 
productive racializing technologies. 
 
 62. For discussions of the prison industrial complex as a relational and historically 
contingent capitalist phenomenon, see generally ANGELA DAVIS, ARE PRISONS 
OBSOLETE? (2003); Gilmore, supra note 3. 
 63. See generally HANNAH APPEL, THE LICIT LIFE OF CAPITALISM: U.S. OIL IN 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA (2019). 
 64. Gilmore, supra note 3, at 182–83. 
 65. Id. at 183. 
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VI. THE SEARCH FOR THE LEGAL SUBJECT AND THE MAKING OF 
THE UNFINISHED REENTRANT-WORKER 
The final institutional reinforcement of the distinctions between 
the market and carcerality is left to the technical terms of the law.  
Take the practices of prison labor in the United States. Justified by 
the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, forced labor as 
criminal punishment was the legal exemption to the banning of 
involuntary servitude and slavery.66  While often the earliest 
manifestations of such practices took the form of chain gangs post-
emancipation, New Orleans has a fascinating history of a carceral 
“private-public partnership” as it was emerging as an American city 
during the Age of Revolutions (1791 and 1825).67  During this time, 
slave owners essentially rented out their slaves to the city prison so 
that they could build the city’s infrastructure and public works.68  
Early criminal justice “innovations” like this practice demonstrate the 
entrenched histories through which carceral labor, the racial order, 
and even the emergent city were and continue to be relationally 
made. 
Such repertoires of racializing labor regimes haunt contemporary 
prison labor, which has primarily taken the form of menial, unskilled 
work for the garment or manufacturing industries.69  However, there 
is reformist faith in small-scale programs that do offer more 
substantial vocational training and perhaps nationally recognized 
skills certifications, especially since these programs seem to 
demonstrate a reduction in recidivism.70  But while the justification 
for these programs focus on training, they do not measure success by 
the socioeconomic stability achieved by the people moving through 
them, as legal practitioner and journalist Emily Galvin writes, “[w]e 
know these programs make people less likely to reoffend by 
 
 66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 67. RASHAUNA JOHNSON, SLAVERY’S METROPOLIS: UNFREE LABOR IN NEW 
ORLEANS DURING THE AGE OF REVOLUTIONS 144–46 (2016). For scholarship on 
prison chain gangs in the American South, see LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 59, at 165–
67. 
 68. See JOHNSON, supra note 67, at 144–46. 
 69. See The Incarcerated Workforce: Prison Labour Is a Billion-Dollar Industry, 
With Uncertain Returns for Inmates, ECONOMIST (Mar. 18, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2017/03/16/prison-labour-is-a-billion-dollar-
industry-with-uncertain-returns-for-inmates [https://perma.cc/89RC-NBWC]. 
 70. See Shawn Bushway, Reentry and Prison Work Programs 5–7 (May 19, 2003) 
(unpublished discussion paper) (on file with The Urban Institute), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/59406/410853-Reentry-and-Priso
n-Work-Programs.PDF [https://perma.cc/278G-DGDZ]. 
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providing job skills, education, engagement, and staving off 
hopelessness — but what about that problem of poverty?”71  In 
arguing that prisoner accumulation of earnings should be in the 
interest of public safety, Galvin writes, “[a]llowing companies to 
exploit hard labor rather than incentivizing them to provide 
meaningful employment is not just morally wrong, it is a dereliction 
of our duty to public safety and rehabilitation.”72  However, in 
framing this appeal, Galvin is essentially assuming that there is a clear 
delineation between the interests and incentives of private companies 
and the interests and incentives of public safety. 
Legal scholars who problematize the market-carcerality separation 
critique the limitations of the law to recognize prisoner-workers as 
legal subjects.  The U.S. Courts of Appeals’ consistent 
characterization of the prison’s relationship to the prisoner as non-
economic and primarily punitive has repeatedly foreclosed the 
potential for employment law to be mobilized in cases arguing the 
exploitation of incarcerated labor.73  As an attorney with the National 
Labor Relations Board, Katherine E. Leung argues that the 
exclusions of prisoner-workers from the Fair Labor and Standards 
Act to receive minimum wage74 and the National Labor Relations 
Act to possess the rights to collectively organize as workers75 should 
itself be a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which 
prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, 
sex, and national origin.76  Leung writes, “The use of prison labor 
functionally creates a second-class labor market, largely made up of 
people of color, which exists outside of Title VII’s protection against 
disparate impact discrimination in the workplace.”77  By discussing 
prison labor in these terms, Leung calls for a reconceptualization of 
the labor-market as a totality that includes the prisoner-workers as a 
 
 71. Emily Galvin, Let Them Work: Prisoners Need Jobs While Still in Prison to 
Break America’s Epidemic of Recidivism, SLATE (Apr. 21, 2016), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2016/04/a-great-way-to-end-recidivism-give-prison
ers-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/5D7J-JZPE]. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Compare Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1556 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
inmates working as contractors for a private firm under a work-release program are 
covered by the FLSA), with Loving v. Johnson, 455 F.3d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that inmates working directly for a prison are not “employees” under the 
FLSA) and Bennett v. Frank, 395 F.3d 409, 410 (7th Cir. 2005) (same). 
 74. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 206 (2016). 
 75. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 157 (2016). 
 76. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). 
 77. Katherine E. Leung, Prison Labor as a Lawful Form of Race Discrimination, 
53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 681, 685 (2018). 
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racially segregated labor pool of poor and predominantly Black and 
Brown people. 
Leung’s arguments critique how the prison is characterized by law 
as outside of the market and, therefore, how the aspirational legal 
subject of racialized prisoner-worker is unrecognizable under current 
legal regimes.  Leung writes that legal precedent has drawn a “clear 
bright-line to define the actors as either jailer or employer,” claiming 
that the one-dimensionality of legal abstractions conveniently 
characterize who is “deserving or undeserving of a statute’s 
protection” without reflecting upon a human being’s experience and 
social relationships.78  Further, in following the prisoner-worker as an 
important relation foreclosed by the law, legal scholar Noah Zatz 
asserts that the law itself is not external to the economy but rather 
“helps produce employment and the labor market as social fields 
separate from other types of relationships.”79 
However, the case study of the New Orleans Reentry Court blurs 
the lines between punitive and labor categorization of legal subjects 
because it is an experimental, soft law innovation.  Reentry Court 
opens a space of legal and social ambivalence between the market 
and carcerality even as it ideologically adheres to their productive 
separation.  This space realizes the contested and ever-shifting 
subjectivity of the racialized reentrant-worker without a clear legal 
delineation between jailer and employer, without a clear legal 
delineation between prisoner and worker, punishment, and labor.  
The experimental and flexible practices of the court render reentrant-
employee relations with employers and the court neither solely 
economic, nor punitive.  The productivity of these mutually 
constitutive relations makes value under neoliberal racial capitalism 
by producing ambiguous, fungible, and underdetermined subject 
positions like the racialized reentrant-worker.  Reentry Court is not a 
governance purgatory toggling between its carceral and market 
identity, but a productive site of capital value creation because of its 
strategic ambiguity. 
So, what then are we supposed to make of the racialized reentrant-
employee as a subject made through technologies of ambiguity?  The 
court manages the employment of reentrants and the value of their 
labor on the market while also holding the ability to enact punitive 
 
 78. Id. at 696. 
 79. Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the 
Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 866 
(2008). 
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sanctions should reentrants not accept or comply with the terms of 
such employment.  The city employers are not legally accountable to 
reentrant employees through a contract, thus producing a tentative 
relation that depends upon the court’s subsidies and coercive power.  
While the private employer is not lawfully accountable for the 
treatment of the reentrant employee, the reentrant-employee can be 
legally intervened upon by the court.  Yet, as the original provocation 
of this critique articulated, the court cannot account for the “natural” 
flows of the market because it insists on being external to and, 
therefore, not responsible for such market phenomena.  The New 
Governance practices of such reform programs work to further 
obscure this process through its experimental and flexible nature, 
which continues to render reentrant-employee relations with 
employers and the court neither solely economic nor punitive.  
Carceral circulations constitute labor markets and this relation 
re/produces and governs racial regimes through the differential 
devaluation of human life, and the devaluation of peoples’ labor 
under racial capitalism. 
CONCLUSION: EMERGENT POLITICAL POTENTIALS   
The New Governance practices of carceral reform programs, like 
Reentry Court, emerge as an underdetermined “nonspace” of legal 
and economic subjectivity.  In this case, the soft law enacted through 
the practices and epistemologies of the Reentry Court produces and 
governs racial regimes through the differential devaluation of human 
life, through the devaluation of peoples’ labor, demonstrating the 
constitutive relation between carceral circulations and labor markets.  
Reentry Court thus re/produces the conditions of neoliberal racial 
capitalism through its productive separation of the market and 
carcerality.  Yet, paying attention to the makings of novel and 
undetermined subjectivities, such as the reentrant-worker, does offer 
critical anticipation that could challenge the frontiers of racialized 
labor. 
To reveal what liberal reform produces by adhering to these 
ideological separations is to reveal the inadequacy of such reform to 
attend to racial justice in the United States.  What would it mean for 
the law and for society to rethink this boundary-making between 
carcerality and the market?  Perhaps the spatial metaphor of borders 
could be helpful.  Gilmore writes, 
Even while borders highlight the distinction between places, they 
also connect places into relationships with each other and with 
noncontiguous places.  So too with prisons: the government-
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organized-and-funded dispersal of marginalized people from urban 
to rural locations suggests both that problems stretch across space in 
a connected way and that arenas for activism are less segregated 
than they seem.80 
In this case, Gilmore is critiquing the commonsense notion that 
prison sits “at the margins of social spaces, economic regions, political 
territories, and fights for rights.”81  As I pursue my work on the 
transformations of carceral technologies, I read this analogy as a call 
to continue to interrogate borders: Why are certain borders common 
sense?  What makes a border productive, and what are the 
technologies of power that render it valuable?  If instead of 
reinforcing borders, we elucidate their productive relations, then what 
sorts of political critiques and potentials would that engender?  A 
move toward racial justice would require a vast shift in the kinds of 
social worlds and relationships we recognize in our everyday 
interactions and in our scholarly analysis of emergent innovations.  It 
would require an intention toward social solidarities that challenge 
the productive separations made common sense under racial 
capitalism.82 
 
 80. GILMORE, supra note 3, at 11. 
 81. Id. 
 82. This shift in language from boundary to border is intentional. As efforts to 
decarcerate Louisiana are being implemented under criminal justice reform, prison 
facilities are being redeployed to detain asylum seekers. My critique of the 
ideological border between the spaces of the free market and the spaces of carceral 
confinement is also a call to recognize how the U.S. national borders are related sites 
of racialized labor devaluation and violent displacement. Immigration detention is 
part of a continuous frontier of carceral reconfiguration and expansion — a relation 
that is obscured by the productive separations of racial capitalism that render the 
reformist project of decarceration as distinct from the movements of migrant labor 
and the militarization of borders. 
